Towards a new consensus in the wake of judicial crisis in Pakistan by Naseer, Sajjad
Panel 41: Pakistan in Transition 
Session 2: Black Coats, White Robes 
 
Towards a New Consensus in the wake of Judicial Crisis in Pakistan 
Sajjad Naseer, 
Lahore School of Economics 
 
 
 
 Pakistan’s chequered political history took yet another turn, when General Pervaiz 
Musharraf ordered the removal of Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan on 9thMarch 2007 by filing a reference against him.1 This triggered a legal and 
political tsunami that swept across the country in varying degrees and intensity. 
Uncharacteristically, the legal community collectively rose to defend their chief and 
demonstrated an unprecedented show of strength and unity. While the legal battle was 
fought in the court, the lawyers added a political dimension to their struggle by resorting to 
street protests, rallies, demonstrations and by boycotting the court proceedings throughout 
the country every Thursday of the week. The political void caused by the inaction of political 
parties was filled by this mobilization process launched by the legal community, and the 
chief justice emerged as more of a hero and Musharraf started looking like a villain. This 
mobilization proceeded with speed and the arrival of the chief on 12th May 2007 at Karachi 
to address the Bar, witnessed a brutal use of violence resulting in forty nine deaths. 
 While the legal community was in the vanguard of this struggle, the political parties, 
civil society groups, intelligentsia, print and electronic media dove ‐ tailed to raise the 
political temperature. Emboldened by the populous sentiment, the Supreme Court Bench 
threw the reference out under Article 209 of the Constitution and unanimously held to 
restore the Chief Justice. This happens to be the first fiercely contested clash between the 
overpowering executive and a subordinate submissive judiciary, resulting in the victory of 
the latter.  
 This lustrous victory turned out to be short ‐ lived and Musharraf lost his nerve with 
the continuing defiant behaviour of the Chief, his colleagues, retired judges and the lawyers 
community. On November 3rd 2007 President Pervaiz Musharraf, in his capacity as the Army 
Chief2, issued a Proclamation of Emergency (“Proclamation”) under which an Emergency 
was imposed in the country and the Constitution was suspended. The same day, a  
Provisional Constitutional Order No 1 of 2007 was issued by the Army Chief under the 
authority that he derived from the Proclamation, while an Oath of Office (Judge) Order 
2007, was issued by the President. It was a unique violation of the constitution, where 
under Clause 2 (1) of the PCO gave the President the power to amend the Constitution 
simply through the issuance of an executive order, and clause 4 authorized him to alter, 
amend or repeal any law of the country. 3 Ironically, this power was allowed to him by the 
then reconstituted Supreme Court (1999) to amend the Constitution (a power that does not 
exist with the Supreme Court under the 1973 Constitution). Assuming all powers, Musharraf 
‘virtually’ sacked 60 judges of the Supreme and High Courts and reconstituted the higher 
judiciary by hand‐picking the judges, reducing the judiciary to its historic subordinate role.4 
 These unusual and dramatic events puzzled political analysts, foreign observers and 
practitioner of politics alike. This may be seen as fallout of the sustained struggle of the 
lawyers for over a year. During this period, people at large began to see more clearly the 
other side of the political spectrum as highlighted by the powerful electronic media. The 
excesses of the regime were debated and analysed; its policies received critical scrutiny and 
the opposition’s political leaders and analysts got regular visibility as they articulated their 
views against the government. The role of print media was no less significant as more and 
more anti Musharraf articles were published regularly. These activities resulted in a general 
state of mobilization, reinforcing the anti Musharraf sentiments without translating into a 
mass movement as there existed structural tensions and the political forces did not coalesce 
on one point. Even after the February 18th 2008 elections, where people gave their verdict 
against Musharraf and his Pakistan Muslim League (Q) Party, the continuing crisis has not 
rested. Even after the formation of Governments at the Federal and Provincial level, there is 
no movement towards the resolution of two contentious issues viz; the restoration of 
judges to their position of November 3rd 2007 and the future of Musharraf. Differences have 
erupted between the major coalition partners, Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan 
Muslim League (N) over these issues and the latter has withdrawn its ministers from the 
federal cabinet as the ‘Bhurban Declaration’ was not implemented.5 The lawyers continued 
to be defiant and organized the ‘Long March’ from all over Pakistan which took five days to 
reach Islamabad. It was a mammoth gathering of its own kind for the capital but fell short of 
its objective as it required besieging the newly elected parliament, which could have serious 
implications for the future of democracy. Without getting into the conflicting opinions and 
evaluation of the outcome of the ‘Long March’; the ‘judges issue’ occupies the centre stage 
of political discourse and activities. As a result, there is a growing perception that the 
government in Islamabad is not fully functional casting doubts about the viability of the new 
political setup.  
 Pakistan is home to a variety of crises on a regular basis and its track record of 
managing these hardly seems encouraging. The multiple crises as witnessed today may be 
summed up as a manifestation of the clash between the forces of status quo and the 
popular will asserted through elections. The parliament has been impotent and the judiciary 
subservient to the will of the Executive. The ‘external variable’ resulting in Pakistan’s 
alignment with the West,  first during Ayub Khan’s rule (1960’s), then a decade of General 
Zia (1980’s) and now nine years of Musharraf (1999 to date) as an ally in the war against 
‘terrorism’ has serious implications for political management. Pakistan in its political history 
has moved much beyond the concept of ‘Praetorian Society’ formulated by Samuel P. 
Huntington in his book, ‘Political Order in Changing Societies’ to explain the emerging 
realities in the developing world.  
 The institutions of the Parliament and the Judiciary have been exploited, 
manipulated and broken at regular intervals. The overpowering Executive has been 
dominant and moved regularly towards monopolizing power. In structural terms, the power 
is concentrated in the Executive through the 17th Amendment, the establishment of 
National Security Council as a supra‐constitutional body and even the terms and conditions 
of the February 18th elections were issued and determined. 
 As multiple crises persist in a stinging manner for over a year, the critical hour has 
arrived and the different players and stake holders need to reach a new consensus about 
the institutional functioning of the polity under a constitutional rule. 
 This paper seeks to explore and examine the various facets of judicial crises’ along 
with other contributing factors. The focus will be to evaluate the place of judiciary in an 
institutional setting, the current political system and its functioning, the lawyer’s movement 
and mobilization, the breakup of the existing consensus and the prospects of a new one 
emerging. 
 
Judicial Activism and Institutional Functioning 
 Though various Constitutional dispensations in Pakistan delineated the role of 
judiciary as an organ of the government in an institutional setting, its role and performance 
fell short of its designated position. This was caused by the repeated military interventions6 
and extended rule by the uniform men for 34 years. This pattern of recurring interventions 
did not allow the judiciary to evolve as an institution. An institution is characterised by its 
longevity, traditions, norms and practices it develops over a period of time. As the life of the 
judiciary was terminated at regular intervals, it failed to develop the features of an 
institution. Each time, the superior judiciary validated the military rule, took oath under the 
‘Provisional Constitutional Order’ issued by the ‘military ruler’. These exercises relegated the 
higher judiciary to a subordinate position to act and work under the coercive power of the 
Executive. The ‘law of necessity’ propounded by Dr Hans Kelsen was interpreted in a 
manner to give protection and validation to military rule. This promoted a judicial culture of 
perpetual subordination depriving the judiciary to play its meaningful role within the ambit 
of the Constitution. Thus the institutional functioning of the superior judiciary is suspect and 
questionable. 
 It is, however, pertinent to note that the Supreme Court at two different occasions 
gave decisions contrary to the ones it habitually pronounced. In the Asma Jillani case, the 
Supreme Court held that the military rule of General Yahya Khan was entirely illegal in 
1972.7 Whereas this judgement is instructive for practitioners of law and politics, the fact of 
the matter is that the regime of Yahya was not in power. This can hardly be a case where 
Supreme Court demonstrated its independence. 
 The second case came up before the Supreme Court in 1993 when the Parliament 
was dissolved and the Prime Minister Nawaz sharif was dismissed by the President of 
Pakistan invoking 58(2B), a power that was vested in the President through the 8th 
Amendment of 1985. The dismissal of the Sharif government came when there was no 
Martial Law and country had experienced the military rule of Zia for 11 years (1977‐88). In 
this context, the Supreme Court full bench declared the dismissal of Sharif government 
illegal and directed its restoration. Surely, this was the first decision of its kind exhibiting 
courage and independence. But the informal dynamics of Pakistani politics prevented 
Nawaz Sharif to return to government or the political leader lacked courage to honour the 
decision. So the decision whatever its worth failed to institutionalise the independence of 
the judiciary.  
 With this background of judicial functioning, the Supreme Court reconstituted after 
the October 1999 military takeover and having taken oath under the ‘Provisional 
Constitutional Order’ began to shape and behave independently. Intriguingly as it may 
appear, the superior judiciary activism falls in the category of ‘public interest litigation’. The 
burden of explaining this newly acquired orientations towards independent behaviour, 
perhaps lie in the prolonged rule of 8 years, its consequences in the context of policies, 
alienation of groups, drop in the popularity of Musharraf and the excessive and 
unconstitutional rule by the Executive. 
 As the cases of ‘public interest’ came before the Supreme Court particularly during 
2007, the Executive began to lose face and in the public perception, such decisions were 
greeted stimulating the judiciary to move on this track. 
 The decisions in three outstanding cases helped the judiciary to assert its 
independence, which eroded the authority of the overpowering executive. The first case 
pertained to the privatisation of the Pakistan Steel Mills. It was held that the Constitutional 
requirement and procedures of the ‘Privatisation Commission’ were ignored and the 
government went through the process in ‘indecent haste’. The second case was ‘Lal Masjid’, 
and the Supreme Court entertained petitions of the arrested and released many on bail.8  
The third case that attracted the attention of the Supreme Court was that of the ‘missing 
persons’. Many people (some put the number over 500) in Pakistan had ‘disappeared’ 
allegedly by the American (FBI, CIA) and Pakistani agencies (ISI,MI,IB) in pursuance of the 
“War on Terror”. These actions were challenged in the Supreme Court and a bench under 
the Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry had directed Ministry of Interior and the 
representatives of the military agencies to appear in Court and answer the issues raised. As 
a result, some people were released but the Supreme Court kept pressing the issue that 
embarrassed the government. These two cases had serious implications in terms of foreign 
policy, particularly ‘War on terror’.9  This was indeed causing cracks on the consensus 
around which different policies were pursued. 
 Apprehending the mood and the newly acquired disposition of the Supreme Court, 
Musharraf anticipating a decision declaring his election as President illegal, moved to 
impose an ‘Emergency’ on November 3rd, 2007, sacking 60 judges of the superior Judiciary. 
Consequently, his position as President is surrounded by controversies,10 and even Mr 
Zardari, co‐chairperson of the Pakistan People’s Party repeatedly declared that his party did 
not accept Musharraf as the constitutional President. 
 ‘Judicial activism’ is a functional category in many democratically governed political 
systems around the world. This tends to work within the democratic framework. Whenever 
a decision of the court helps the people at large or provides relief even on policy issues, the 
democratic government takes the decision in good stride as it does not erode the legitimacy 
of the government. Hence judicial activism is compatible with democratic government. On 
the contrary, it runs into problems as it is incompatible with authoritarian dispensation. The 
decisions of the superior Judiciary threatened the legitimacy of Musharraf government and 
caused fissures in the consensus on foreign policy. 
 
Political System and its Functioning 
 General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, seized power in a bloodless coup 
on October 12, 1999 by deposing Mian Nawaz Shariff the then Prime Minister of Pakistan 
and his elected government, which commanded a two‐third majority in both the houses, 
proclaiming to be the Chief Executive and not the Chief Martial Law Administrator.11 On 
October 17, 1999, the General in his address to the nation outlined the aims and objectives 
of his regime by pledging to implement the seven‐point agenda.12 The Supreme Court 
validated his take ‐ over, directing him to hold elections in three years but strangely enough, 
empowered him to amend the Constitution. 
 9/11 2001, changed the political fortunes of Musharraf as he decided to be an ally of 
the U.S in its war on terrorism. This virtually ended the isolation of his regime from the 
international community. Encouraged by this engagement and supported by the ‘allies’ 
economic and military support, he decided to move quickly on the home political turf. 
 On April 30, 2002, Musharraf ordered a ‘referendum’ for his election as the 
President of Pakistan and the Pakistan Election Commission declared him winner, having 
captured 97% votes. While he ensured his position as President of Pakistan for 5 years, the 
opposition alleged gross irregularities in polls and according to their count, only 5 to 7% 
voted in the ‘referrendum’.13 
 Before venturing for the exercise of the ‘referendum’, the ISI and MI were shaping 
the political landscape since 1999, creating a new Muslim League, supervising, and 
monitoring the outcome of the 2000 local elections, queering the pitch for the 2002 general 
elections, organising the defection of the Patriots from the PPP, and getting the 17th 
Amendment, which gives constitutional cover to General Musharraf’s actions, passed with 
the help of the MMA mullahs.14 The 17th Amendment changed the equation of power in 
favour of the President empowering him to dismiss the government and also set up the 
National Security Council as a supra‐constitutional body to oversee the working of the civil 
government. Musharraf also promised to drop his uniform at the end of 2004, 15 which he 
did not honour. 
 Having fractured the mainstream political parties and keeping their leadership in 
exile, the elections of 2002 yielded a political outfit tailored to suit the needs of the 
Musharraf regime. The decision‐making centred around the presidency and the assembled 
weak political forces played no role on key domestic and foreign policy issues, though it is 
proudly claimed that this is the first assembly of Pakistan having completed its five year 
term. 
 As the war on terrorism intensified and the consequences of Musharraf’s policies 
alienated groups and parties, the need was felt to negotiate realignment of political forces. 
It was realised that one mainstream political party (PPP) be taken on board along with the 
Kings Party and MQM to form a coalition to have a replay of 2002 – 2007. 
 It is interesting to note that the external variables played a key role in bringing about 
an understanding between Musharraf and Benazir of PPP. Washington initiated the process 
and was outsourced to London at a later stage. It successfully culminated in the return of 
Benazir to enter the politics of Pakistan. This activated the third variable (Saudi Arabia) to 
push for the return of Nawaz Sharif, who had lived in exile in that country before moving on 
to London. This pressure facilitated the return of Sharif’s family back in Pakistan and Nawaz 
Sharif entered the politics of Pakistan by taking a hard anti‐Musharraf line. 
 The entry of these mainstream political leaders along with others was made possible 
through a ‘National Reconciliation Ordinance’ enabling the disabled politicians to enter 
politics. The assassination of Benazir postponed elections for six weeks to be held on 
February 18, 2008. These elections took place on Musharraf’s terms and conditions. The 
election process was manipulated but the outcome of elections changed the political 
landscape of Pakistan. Musharraf’s Pakistan Muslim League (Q) lost as people of Pakistan 
generally cast an anti – Musharraf vote. Political situation further changed as mainstream 
political parties formed a coalition government at the centre. Nawaz Sharif persisted with 
his strident anti – Musharraf rhetoric and Zardari limping under the ‘Reconciliation 
Ordinance’. 
 For three months, the coalition partners failed to resolve the judges issue nor moved 
to impeach the President. The structural constraints inherent in the rules of politics issued 
by Musharraf inhibit any movement forward. Additionally, Washington continued its 
support of Musharraf and seeking to win over Zardari to possibly re‐arrange the 
governmental setup according to the original plan.17 The federal government seems 
paralysed and many hiccups in the provincial setups. The democratic forces haltingly 
struggling to regain the political space but the status‐quo forces are resisting. The 
opposition forces (APDM) to Musharraf keep their pressure and luring Nawaz Sharif to join 
them. As the political forces are pulling and pushing within and outside the system, there is 
a stalemate which cannot stay like this for long. There is an urgency to negotiate another 
contract or political dispensation enabling the political system to function. 
 
Lawyers Movement and Mobilisation: 
 The removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry on March 9, 2007 will stand out as an 
extraordinary event which played a pivotal role in trying to change the legal and political 
landscape of Pakistan. Initially, the legal community rose in protest against the 
unconstitutional decision but soon they moved to the streets to demonstrate peacefully. 
The Bars of the Superior Judiciary, District and even Tehsil level legal forums joined in to 
display a remarkable show of strength and unity. The lawyers rallied around the objective of 
restoring the Chief Justice and demanded an independent Judiciary. 
 These protests and rallies turned political, as workers of almost all political parties 
including the PPP and the ML(N), civil society groups, intelligensita, print and electronic 
media supported the cause of the lawyers. Political forces which had remained dormant all 
these years got an opening to flex their muscles. This mobilisation of public opinion by the 
lawyers made the judiciary feel powerful and on July 20, 2007, a 13 – member bench of the 
Supreme Court reinstated the Chief Justice unanimously and unequivocally. 
 This decision was a serious set‐back to Musharraf regime, which had made 
preparations for getting him elected for another five year term with President in uniform 
and without Benazir and Nawaz Sharif returning home. Musharraf also sought this election 
from his tailor – made Parliament, whose term was to expire soon thereafter. 
 The revived Supreme Court supported by public opinion was a serious challenge to 
Musharraf’s authority and perceiving it as a threat to the continuation of his rule, he 
decided to disband it by imposing ‘Emergency Rule’ in the country. He recreated the 
judiciary in his own image by re‐writing the constitution with an executive order. 
 The lawyers continued their struggle which culminated into a six‐day ‘long march’ 
ending before dawn in Islamabad on June 14, 2008. Nawaz Shariff along with other 
opposition parties fully participated. Paradoxically, Nawaz as a coalition partner took part 
but the other partner, the PPP, stood out seeking resolution of the problem through a 
constitutional package in the Parliament. The lawyers faced the dilemma of confronting a 
newly born parliament and prudently decided not to besiege the representatives of the 
people. This dashed the hopes of thousands who were hoping for the decision through 
pressure tactics. This abrupt termination of the long march without reaping the dividends 
caused cracks within the legal community and its leadership. It also disappointed the public 
at large and resolution of the problem appears to be problematic. 
 In the comparative politics literature, there is discussion to explain the activities that 
were launched by the lawyers. In developing countries, where the political system is not 
functional to respond to the needs and demands of groups, there erupts ‘anomic interest 
group’ activity. As more and more groups begin to join, the protests expand and grow in size 
and momentum. Students, trade unions and political parties enter the process and begin to 
shape as a mass movement. This activity becomes threatening and has the potential to 
overthrow the government. Mobilisation of groups is the key to success yet it fails to 
capture power after the government is removed. 
 This formulation holds validity in the case of Pakistan twice in its history. The mass 
movement against Ayub Khan (1968 ‐ 1969) and Bhutto (1977) toppled their respective 
governments but resulted in the military take‐over in each case. The dynamics of the 
ongoing crises are different. 
 The mobilisation generated by the lawyer’s movement failed to attract several 
important elements like the trade unions, student bodies of public sector universities 
professional groups, big businesses and the Muslim League (Q) and MQM. Additionally, the 
support of the west stayed with Musharraf and the army of Pakistan held back its support to 
the mobilisation process. Without the participation of these vital elements, the movement 
of the lawyers failed to grow and shape into a mass movement. 
 The elections of Feburary 18, 2008, though upset the political calculations of the 
regime, the mainstream coalition partners articulated divergent strategies on the 
restoration of the judges. This inevitably helped Musharraf to stay on despite his 
unpopularity. Despite the widespread demand for the restoration of judges, the divided 
groups and forces have resulted in a stalemate awaiting resolution. 
Towards a New Consensus: 
 Any political system to be stable and sustainable needs to be based on consensus. 
The pre‐condition for an efficient political system is the widespread acceptance of decision‐
making process which is called consensus. When consensus exists, the state is legitimized. 
Consensus and legitimacy are the key indicators of a political system; its absence translates 
into instabilities and uncertainties. Legitimacy also means observing constitutional rules and 
regulation and political legitimacy implies overwhelming support for the political system. 
 Pakistani consensus building was the consequence of 9/11 and Musharraf regime 
was accommodated and accepted by the international community. This enabled Musharraf 
to manufacture and engineer a ‘political arrangement’ domestically through various 
motions of electoral politics. The consensus with west was dominant and overlapped into 
the domestic politics. This consensus was shaken by the decisions of the Supreme Court 
particularly on the missing persons and the lawyer’s movement further threatened it. The 
elections of February 18, was seen and interpreted as an anti‐Musharraf vote, which 
changed the domestic political setup. The present federal government is not the one that 
Musharraf had in mind. 
 The democratic forces have been unleashed but the status‐quo forces are doing 
their best to prevent the change. There are divisions regarding the support for the political 
system; in fact the demand for changing the system is growing signalling a crisis of political 
legitimacy. The democratic forces are also vociferous about the restoration of the consensus 
constitution of 1973. Both on consensus and legitimacy issues there are serious problems 
translating into instability and uncertainty. The external variable is doing its best to win over 
the PPP to cement the cracks that have emerged in the consensus operating since 9/11.  
This contest between opposing forces is taking a heavy toll and it is to be seen which 
combination of political forces prevails. The time, however, has come to negotiate a new 
consensus to ensure the continuity of the state. 
 
 
 
End Notes 
1. The reference included charges of misconduct and corruption. 
2. Pervez Musharraf relinquished the office of Army Chief later that month on 
November 28, 2007. 
3. The Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary, Islamabad, Saturday, November 3, 2007, Part 
1, P. 1459. 
4. The sacked judges, particularly those of the Supreme Court were put under house 
arrest along with their family members. They were set free through a ‘verbal order’ 
of the Prime Minister, Mr Yousuf Reza Gillani during his first speech on the floor of 
the National Assembly. 
5. The Bhurban Declaration signed by Mr Zardari and Nawaz Shariff pledged to restore 
the deposed the deposed judges to their November 2, 2007 position within 30 days, 
a commitment that still awaits implementation. 
6. Pakistan was subjected to 5 Martial laws; the two by Musharraf escaped the term 
Martial Law due to global climate and its compulsions; the last one was declared an 
‘emergency’ though he exercised power as Army Chief, deposing judges and 
amending the constitution. 
7. For detailed discussion of the case, see PLD 1972 SC49. 
8. The Lal Masjid (Mosque) in Islamabad housed supposedly militants fully armed and 
Musharraf government ordered military operation against them that lasted for nine 
days resulting in dozens killed. 
9. That is why the US did not object to the ‘emergency’ declared by Musharraf on 3rd 
November 2007 and issued no statement regarding the restoration of judges. 
10. Some commentators view the ongoing term of President Pervez Musharraf as his 
third term in office. Under Article 44(2) of the constitution the Presidential terms are 
limited to two consecutive terms. 
11. In the obtaining climate of globalising world, martial laws were not welcomed. 
Despite, Musharraf’s packaging of his take‐over that may not look as martial law, the 
western world reacted negatively; Pakistan was suspended from the Common‐
Wealth and for three years Pakistan faced the worst kind of acute isolationism. 
12. See article by Ardeshir Cowasjee in the daily Dawn of June 4, 2006, where the 
evaluates the performance of Musharraf regime in the light of hus famous Seven‐
Point agenda. 
13. http://news.bbc.co.uk retrieved June 28, 2008. 
14. See Ayaz Amir’s article, ‘The meaning of enlightened moderation’ in the daily Dawn 
of March 4, 2005. 
15. Musharraf did not honour his word and continued to wear uniform till the end of 
2007. 
16. See the Daily Times, Lahore, October 6, 2007. The Ordinance enabled the corrupt 
elements to be eligible to take part in politics. This was a violation of the UN 
Convention against corruption. 
17. The original plan envisaged a PPP led government with Pakistan Muslim League (Q) 
and MQM as coalition partners.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexure‐1 
Name of Court Total number of judges 
before the Proclamation 
Number of judges who 
refused to take oath 
Supreme Court of Pakistan 18 13 
Lahore High Court 31 11 
Sindh High Court 28 14 
Peshawar High court 13 4 
Balochistan High Court 5 0 
 
 
